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Abstract—While Proof-of-Work (PoW) is the most widely
used consensus mechanism for blockchain, it received harsh
criticism due to its massive waste of energy for meaningless
hash calculation. Some studies have introduced Proof-of-Stake to
address this issue. However, such protocols widen the gap between
rich and poor and in the worst case lead to an oligopoly, where
the rich control the entire network. Other studies have attempted
to translate the energy consumption of PoW into useful work, but
they have many limitations, such as narrow application scope,
serious security issues and impractical incentive model.
In this paper, we introduce AxeChain, which can use the
computing power of blockchain to solve practical problems
raised by users without greatly compromising decentralization
or security. AxeChain achieves this by coupling hard problem
solving with PoW mining. We model the security of AxeChain
and derive a balance curve between power utilization and system
security. That is, under the reasonable assumption that the attack
power does not exceed 1/3 of the total power, 1/2 of total power
can be safely used to solve practical problems. We also design
a novel incentive model based on the amount of work involved
in problem solving, balancing the interests of both the users and
miners. Moreover, our experimental results show that AxeChain
provides strong security guarantees, no matter what kind of
problem is submitted.
Index Terms—Blockchain; Proof-of-Work; Mining; Computing
service; Useful work
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the debut of Bitcoin [1], blockchain has attracted
lots of attentions and been used in various areas. Blockchain
systems leverage consensus mechanisms to reach consensus
on each block, which contains a set of transactions. Although
many consensus algorihtms have been proposed [2], PoW
is the most widely used one. For example, Bitcoin [1] and
Ethereum [3], the top two cryptocurrencies, are using PoW.
Unfortunately, PoW has received harsh criticism due to its
massive waste of energy for meaningless hash calculation [4].
For example, the peak power consumption of Bitcoin network
reaches 60 billion kWh/year [5], while Denmark’s electricity
consumption in 2014 was only 32 billion kWh [6].
For the energy waste in PoW, the current alternative is
Proof-of-Stake (PoS) [7]. Under PoS, miners compete for the
book-keeping right based on their mortgaged stake rather than
computing power, and these stake will be confiscated if they
are evil. PoS is based on the assumption that the more stake
a miner has, the less likely it is to attack the blockchain
network. First of all, whether this assumption is reasonable
or not remains to be explored. For example, on September
26, 2018, the cryptocurrency exchange Huobi was caught in
a scandal of voting control in the EOS [8] consensus node
election [9]. Secondly, the issue of the disparity between the
rich and poor caused by PoS is affirmative. At present, there
are still many disputes about PoS [10], [11], and its safety and
robustness are not superior to PoW.
Although some other studies translate the energy consump-
tion of PoW into useful work, they have many limitations,
such as narrow application scope, serious security issues
and impractical incentive model. For example, some studies
[12], [13] replace hash calculation with search of prime
sequence. However, their application scope is narrow. While
others [14]–[16] translate the energy consumption of PoW
into solving practical problems like NP problems, we find
serious security issues in them. More precisely, under the
consensus mechanisms in [14], [15], a miner can generate a
block and get reward if it solves the NP-complete problem
or the traditional PoW puzzle. We name such strategy as
binary block-generation strategy (BBGS), because it has two
ways to generate new blocks. We find that attackers can
exploit such mechanisms to make the blockchain system have
extremely low availability and security because the generation
of new block is seriously affected by the difficulty of problems
submitted by users (Please refer to the details in Section
III). Apart from the security issues, existing studies lack a
reasonable incentive model to protect the fairness of interests
between miners and users. For example, in [14]–[16], the
reward for solving problem is subjectively determined by
users. Since it is difficult to accurately assess the difficulty of
the problem, users may worry about paying too much, while
miners worry about too little income.
In this paper, we propose AxeChain, which integrates prac-
tical problem solving into PoW mining in a secure manner.
In particualr, we design the Axe blockchain architecture
and Virtual machine stack sampling proof algorithm to
address the security issues of BBGS. Moreover, we propose
a novel incentive model, that assign reward according to the
amount of work exactly involved in calculating the problem,
to avoid the loss of both the users and miners. It is worth
noting that this paper also introduces a more flexible and
versatile method for representing general problems in a smart
contract, which can expand the application scope of AxeChain.
The security analysis of AxeChain in this paper shows that
under the reasonable assumption that attackers’ power does not
exceed 1/3 of the total computing power, the system can obtain
1/2 of the power utilization radio. That is, half of the total
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computing power can be used to solve the practical problems.
This paper makes the following contributions:
• To our best knowledge, AxeChain is the first Strongly
Secure and Fully Decentralized blockchain for solving
Easily-Verifiable problems. AxeChain is not only a secure
decentralized ledger system, but also a decentralized
computing platform with strong computing power.
• We design a novel incentive model based on the amount
of work exactly involved in calculating the problem,
which can balance the interests between users and miners.
• We design a flexible approach for representing general
problems, which can expand the application scope of
AxeChain.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces some background and preliminaries of this paper,
while Section III analyzes the security issues of BBGS in
the existing studies. Section IV and V will introduce two
highlights of this paper, which address the above security
issues. Then, we introduce a novel incentive model in Section
VI and present some experimental results in Section VII.
Finally,we present some related works in Section VIII and
make a conclusion in Section IX.
II. BACKGROUND
A. PoW & PoS
PoW in main cryptocurrencies, including Bitcoin [1] and
Ethereum [3], require a large amount of computing resources
to reach consensus on each block. In a PoW-based blockchain
system, the generation and verification of a block involves
a mathematical problem (also called a PoW puzzle). The
difficulty in finding the answer to the puzzle is moderate,
but verifying the correctness of the answer is easy. Miners
must invest a lot of computing resources to find the answer
to the PoW puzzle in each consensus round, so the system
should cooperate with a incentive model to reward miners. An
inappropriate incentive model will cause the loss of computing
power and lead to inadequate computing power in the whole
network. In this case, it is easier for a malicious miner to obtain
more than half of the computing power of the entire network to
attack the blockchain, that is majority-attack [17]. Currently,
there are mainly two different POW consensus mechanisms.
Bitcoin’s PoW is a computationally-intensive consen-
sus mechanism used by Bitcoin. Under Bitcoin’s PoW,
when mining, miners constantly perform two rounds of
SHA2(Nonce, block header) [18] to get a hash (two-round
hash is designed to avoid the potential Malleability-Attack [19]
of SHA-2). For convenience, in this paper, we call this hash
as a workload or a final workload, which used for comparison
with the target to determine whether to generate a new block.
Only if the workload is less than the target can miners generate
a new block. The unidirectionality of the hash algorithm
ensures that miners cannot reverse the legal Nonce from the
target. Miners can only find a legal Nonce by constantly
traversing the Nonce field and doing hash calculation.
Ethash [20] is another PoW consensus mechanism used
by Ethereum. Unlike Bitcoin’s PoW, Ethash is IO-intensive
and is designed to withstand Application Specific Integrated
Circuit (ASIC) [21]. ASIC mining rigs makes each hash
operation faster and consumes less energy, but it also raises
the uptake barriers for peers to participate in consensus.
Ethash was originally designed to allow more people to
use common computer to participate in consensus without
buying ASIC mining rigs. Under Ethash, miners will gen-
erate a GB-level directed acyclic graph based on a seed
before consensus. When mining, miners perform one round
of SHA3(Nonce, block header) [22] to get an initial mixed
result mix0. Then, based on the indexs generated by mix0,
miners take fragments from the directed acyclic graph, and
then use FNV [23] to fully mix the fragments with mix0 to
obtain a new mixed result mixnew. Finally, miners perform
another round of SHA3(mix0,mixnew) to generate a final
workload, which is used to compare with the target. There-
fore, the bottleneck in Ethash workload generation is to read
fragment from a GB-level directed acyclic graph. Compared
to Bitcoin’s PoW, Ethash is more focused on the fast IO
capabilities of computers.
Different from PoW, PoS does not requires a lot of comput-
ing resources to reach consensus on new blocks. PoS selects
the creator of the block in a defined manner, which usually
depends on the stake of the miners. The more stake, the greater
the chance that the miner will be selected as the creator.
Current Pos-based blockchain systems use different methods
to produce the randomnes in the creator election to ensure
system security [24]–[26]. However, the current PoS is still
very controversial [10], [11], and its security and robustness
are not superior to PoW.
B. Smart Contract and Virtual machine
The concept of smart contract was first proposed by Nick
Szabo in 1994 [27], but its ideas have not progressed. Until
2014, as part of the Ethereum smart contract system, smart
contract first appeared. In Ethereum, the execution of smart
contract is driven by transactions. A smart contract is essen-
tially bytecode. Users write the business logic in a high-level
language and then submit and deploy the compiled bytecode
to the blockchain. The bytecode that is deployed on the
blockchain is called a smart contract. Every smart contract
has its own storage space and its own state, and the transfer
of state is only determined by the logic of the contract itself.
The bytecode of the smart contract is executed on the
blockchain virtual machine. At present, the blockchain virtual
machine is divided into Turing-complete virtual machine and
Non-Turing-complete virtual machine. The difference between
the two is that Turing-complete virtual machine supports the
loop statement. Because halting problem [28] is unsolvable,
the Turing-complete blockchain virtual machine needs to
introduce a gas mechanism to solve the dead loop problem.
Before the smart contract is executed, the user must provide a
certain amount of gas. Gas is a scarce resource that is acquired
by cryptocurrency purchase or mortgage. The blockchain
virtual machine consumes a certain amount of gas to exe-
cute bytecode, while different bytecode consume a different
amount of gas. The gas consumed by the bytecode shows
its computational cost. Under the gas mechanism, even if the
logic of the smart contract is an infinite loop, its execution
will eventually stop because of the exhaustion of gas. At
present, Turing-complete virtual machine is adopted by smart
contract platforms such as Ethereum, because only Turing-
completeness can support complex decentralized application
logic. Non-Turing-complete blockchain virtual machine does
not support looping statements, thus avoiding halting problem.
This type of virtual machine is used by the decentralized
transfer platforms, such as Bitcoin, which does not need to
support complex logic.
III. SECURITY ISSUES IN BBGS
As shown in Figure 1, under BBGS, miners constantly
perform H = Hash(Nonce, block header) get a workload
H . If H is less than the target, miners can generate a new
block; otherwise, they will Map H to a potential solution (x,
y, z) and then substitute (x, y, z) into function F (the logic of
the problem is written inside F) to verify if it is a correct
solution to the current problem. If the function F returns
True, miners can also generate a new block. BBGS can ensure
that the system can still generate new blocks by degenerating
to the traditional PoW when the problem has no solution.
However, this strategy also causes the block-generation time to
be affected by the difficulty of the problems, which impairs the
availability of the system and makes the difficulty retargeting
of the blockchain meaningless. In addition, BBGS can lead to
serious security issues. Next, we will analyze these issues in
detail based on the consensus process in Figure 1.
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Fig. 1. BBGS consensus process
Issue 1: An attacker submits a very easy problem whose
F(x, y, z) always returns True. When mining, all miners solve
the problem instantaneously and then generate and broadcast
a new block. At this time, the network will be congested,
resulting in a large number of forks which reduces the system
availability. In extreme cases, each miner will only work on
his own fork and the system’s computing power will be diluted
to all forks, so most of the computing power will be wasted
rather than being used to s lve problems. In a dition, a large
number of forks means that there are multiple ledgers in the
system, and the system is extremely unstable.
Issue 2: An attacker submits a problem that takes a long
time to calculate but has no solution, that is F(x, y, z) always
returns False. The detail of the attack strategy is shown in
Figure 2. Here, we analyze the different behaviors of the
attacker and honest miners:
1) When H<Target, there is no difference.
2) When H≥Target, the behavior of the attacker and
honest miners is quite different. The attacker knows
that the problem has no solution and calculating the
problem is time-consuming, so he will skip the time-
consuming operation of the black box in Figure 2. In
other words, he does not waste the computing power to
calculate the problem. The attacker will directly chooses
the new Nonce to start the next round of collision while
the honest miners will still calculate the problem before
choosing a new Nonce.
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Fig. 2. Attack strategy to BBGS
Assuming that time of calculating the problem is 1000
times that of one hash calculation, the attack r’s equivalent
computing power is 1000 times that of a honest miner with
the same physical computing power. In this case, an attacker
can easily launch a majority-attack on blockchain without
aggregating a large amount of computing power.
IV. SYSTEM DESIGN
A. Axe blockchain architecture
Axe blockchain architecture is a new blockchain underlying
architecture designed specifically for addressing Issue 1 of
BBGS. Issue 1 is essentially because the block generation is
affected by the problem solving, that is, the problem solving
becomes one of the decisive factors in the block generation.
Since the difficulty of the problem is unknown, the difficulty
of mining cannot be adjusted. Figure 3 depicts the architecture
of the Axe blockchain. Each block in Axe blockchain consists
of a block header cluster and a block body. A block header
cluster can contain multiple block headers, which are mainly
divided into two types: master block header and slave block
header. The data structure of Axe blockchain looks like an
axe.
• Master block header (blue flag): There must be a unique
master block header in the block header cluster. Master
block header corresponds to the block body (orange flag)
through the Merkel Root. The miner who mines master
block header successfully is called the master miner. The
master min r is responsible for the packing of the block
transactions and the inclusion of the slave block headers.
A legal master block header must satisfy the requirement
that its workload is less than the target.
• Slave block header (gray flag): The number of slave
block header is variable. Slave block header can be mined
by slave miners and included into the block header cluster
by master miners. A legal slave block header must satisfy
the requirement that its corresponding problem is solved.
Block ID : X
Height : H
Block ID : Y
Height : H + 1
Master block header H3 : Q3
Slave block header H2 : Q2
Slave block header H1 : Q1
Block body
Problems queue : [Q1,Q2,Q3,Q4]
Previous block ID : X
Current problem position (Pos) : 1
Random value (Nonce) : nonce_5
Miner address (address) : Alice
Master block header H5 : Q4
Slave block header H4 : Q3
Block body
Previous block ID : X
Current problem position (Pos) : 0
Random value (Nonce) : nonce_4
Miner address (address) : Bob
Problems queue : [Q3,Q4]
Fig. 3. Axe blockchain architecture
As shown in Figure 3, the problem Q1 corresponding to
the slave block header H1 needs to be solved, and the
problem Q3 corresponding to the slave block header H4
needs to be solved.
Next, we will take the block with H + 1 height as an
example to describe the process of block generation in Axe
blockchain. First, Alice packages the transactions and con-
structs a block header. Then, Alice sets the Pos field of the
block header to zero and extracts the highest priority problem
Q3 from the queue. Alice try to traverse the Nonce to solve
Q3. However, when solving Q3, Bob first solves Q3 and
broadcasts the corresponding slave block header H4. Alice
receives H4 from Bob and verifies that Q3’s answer is correct.
After successful verification, H4 is included as a slave block
header into its own block header cluster. Since Q3 has been
solved by Bob, Alice gives up solving Q3 and sets the Pos
field to 1 and then extracts the problem Q4 from the queue.
When solving Q4, Alice reaches the required workload for
the block generation and then inlcudes the block header H5
as a master block header into the block header cluster and
broadcasts the entire block. Because Alice took the lead in
completing the calculation work of PoW in the blockchain
network, Alice’s block was verified by other peers and written
to the local database. In summary, a legal block header cluster
needs to meet the following requirements:
1) The Merkel Root on the master block header is equal to
that generated by the block body.
2) The workload of the master block header is less than
the difficulty target.
3) The previous block hash referenced from the slave block
headers is the same as that of the master block header,
which ensures that the master and slave miners are based
on the same blockchain branch for consensus.
4) The problem corresponding to the slave block header is
solved.
5) The Pos field from slave block header to master block
header is starting from zero and continuous. In partic-
ular, the Pos field value of the master block header
is the largest among all block headers in the block.
This condition ensures that the problem is solved in
turn and no problem is skipped. This also means that
miners can not freely select the problem, ensuring that
the computing power of the entire network is calculating
the same problem at the same moment.
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Fig. 4. Consensus process in Axe blockchain architecture
As shown in Figure 4, in Axe blockchain, a miner only
generates a slave block header (the size is small) but not a
new block when successfully solving a problem. The new
block generation is independent of problem solving and is
only controlled by the current difficulty target, so there won’t
be a lot of forks as described in Issue 1. Such a design has
great ignificance for ensuring the stability of block generation
rate and the effectiveness of the difficulty retargeting. The size
of the slave block header is small so it spreads quickly in the
network, thus reducing the possibility of network congestion.
At the same time, the number of slave block headers in a block
is limited. When encountering potential malicious problems
(that is, the n twork is overwhelmed with many slave block
headers), miners can choose not to broadcast and forward the
corresponding slave block headers to prevent possible network
congestion without affecting the consensus.
B. Problem Definition
Problem representation: At present, there are two main
methods to represent the problem: (1) hard-code, such as the
search of prime sequence in Primecoin [12]; (2) representing
the problem as a specific format in [14], [15], such as reducing
NP problems to a type of NP-complete problems. However,
these two methods have great drawbacks. The first method
can only solve a single problem. This method lacks versatility,
practicality and cannot meet the various needs of users. The
second method requires users to convert the problem into
a standard format and submit the corresponding parameters,
which is very unfriendly to users. In addition, standard format
conversions takes a lot of work and may introduce higher
computational complexity. The second method is less expres-
sive, which makes it difficult to represent problems in complex
scenarios.
In this paper, we use Turing-complete high-level language to
represent a problem as a smart contract. Therefore, any com-
plex problem can be well represented and the programming
of the problem contract is in line with user habits. The design
essentially represents all problems as compiled bytecode. The
bytecode is the basic computing unit for the blockchain virtual
machine. Any problem can be reduced to a combination of
basic units, so the amount of work involved in solving any
problem can be measured based on the basic unit. In addition,
the gas mechanism can limit the running time of the problem
contract on the virtual machine, preventing miners from taking
too long to verify the correctness of a potential solution to the
problem.
Problem Contract Template: A problem contract can be
considered as a special type of smart contract. Using smart
contract programming language to express common problems
has the following advantages: (1) in line with user habits; (2)
strong expressive ability; (3) blockchain can be used as a data
source; (4) compatible with current smart contract platform
tools and workflows. Users can complete the programming
of a problem contract by inheriting the provided template
and implementing the relevant interface. A problem contract
mainly includes tip, deposit, solution space and arithmetic
logic. Four public interfaces of the problem contract template
can be list as follows:
• getTips: This interface returns the tip. Users should pay
for the system when deploying a problem contract. The
total cost inlcudes the tip and deposit. The tip determines
the priority of the problem and the deposit is used to pay
for the calculation of the problem.
• getSpaceInfo: This interface returns the type and scope
of the solution space. The solution space is an array
of n rows and 2 columns, indicating the range of each
dimension.
• getTimes: This interface returns the number of problem
solutions that the user requested to find.
• solve: This interface returns a boolean value, which
represents whether the potential solution is correct for
the problem. Users can implement the logic code of the
problem inside solve, describing what is the solution to
the problem. solve is executed continuously in the virtual
machine to solve the problem.
Problem Contract Sample: The problem submitted to Ax-
eChain must be Easily-Verifiable, which means that verifying
the correctness of a potential solution cannot take too long.
Therefore, most NP problems can be submitted to AxeChain
because the answer to these problems can be verified in
polynomial time. In general, NP problems lack efficient al-
gorithm and finding their solutions takes decades of time on a
normal computer, so they are suitable for being submitted to
AxeChain, where all computers on a distributed environment
attempt to solve a single problem at the same time. In
addition, non-linear integer programming problems can also be
submitted to AxeChain, most of which were proved to be NP-
complete [29], [30]. Even more interesting and exciting is that
AxeChain can help humans solve problems in Number Theory,
such as solving Diophantine Equation [31]. In September
2019, mathematicians Andrew Sutherland and Andrew Booker
found a (x1, x2, x3) that satisfied x31 + x
3
2 + x
3
3 = 42, causing
a sensation in the mathematical world [32].
In addition, AxeChain is well suited for some query work
in the blockchain domain. At present, most of the blockchains
use key-value databases. Since key-value database does not
support the value query very well, the user can only find
the potential legal value in the blockchain by traversing the
whole database. For example, the blockchain project party
selects the active account for Token Airdrop [33]. However,
since traversing the whole database is slow and the data on
blockchain is updated in real time, the result of the query may
be delayed. Similar jobs that filtering data on blockchain can
be written as a problem contract submitted to AxeChain. All
miners can filter data in parallel, so they can finish the work
quickly.
In essence, any problem can be submitted to AxeChain
as long as the verification time is not too long (Easily-
Verifiable). In addition, AxeChain represents a problem as a
smart contract in a high-level language, making the submission
of problems more flexible and versatile. Here, we provide a
problem contract sample of a classic subset sum problem (a
NP problem). As shown in Figure 5, this problem contract
indicates: Given a set S = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, find a subset of S
whose sum is 9. It is worth noting that the function getTimes
returns 2, which means that the user want the system to find
two solutions. More examples of problem contracts can be
found in the appendix of this paper.
C. Problem Life Cycle
In this subsection, we will describe the life cycle of a
problem from the process of deployment, consensus, and exit.
Problem Deployment: The process of problem contract
deployment is shown in Figure 6. Users compile the problem
contract to get the corresponding bytecode, and then use the
bytecode to construct a transaction and send the transaction
to System Contract. System Contract is a smart contract
that manages problem contracts, that is, maintains a problem
queue. The design that deploying a problem by sending a
transaction is compatible with current wallet applications.
The cost of deploying a problem is the sum of the deposit
and tip. The tip is used to increase the priority of the problem
and the deposit is used to reward miners for solving problems.
AxeChain’s charging model is based on the amount of work
involved in calculating the problem, rather than deducting
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Fig. 6. The process of problem contract deployment
all deposit directly. Such a design mainly takes into account
that it is difficult to acc rately access the difficulty of the
problem and give a fair remuneration. Under AxeChain’s
charging model, users will be willing to submit problems
without worrying about paying too much and miners will not
suffer losses due to low remuneration.
After receiving the problem, AxeChain extracts the arith-
metic logic (the logic inside the interface solve), solution
space, deposit and tip of the problem to construct a problem
object, and then inserts it into the problem queue. The problem
queu is a priority queue. The priority of the problem is
determined by the tip and insertion time, and is not affected
by the deposit. It is worth noting that the tip will be destroyed
directly without being gi n to miners. This design is to
prevent miners from receiving problems with high tip only.
The problem priority socre can be calculated as:
score(i, tip) = tip× k−i (1)
The tip is given by the user, and i is the order in which
the problem is inserted in the current queue. i = 0 means that
the problem is the earliest insertion of the current queue. k
is a constant greater than 1, used to weigh the impact of tip
and i on priority. Higher tip and earlier insertion mean higher
priority. The relationship between the tip and i is shown in
Equation 2. Equation 2 shows that if the tip of a problem is
k times that of the previous one, the problem has the same
priority as the previous one. There is a default problem in the
queue (such as looking for prime sequence) and its priority is
the lowest in the queue. The default problem is to prevent the
queue from being empty.
score(i, tip)≡score(i+ 1, k×tip) (2)
Problem Consensus: As shown in Figure 7, when mining,
miners first retrieve the highest priority problem from the
problem queue and load the bytecode of the problem into
the Turing-complete stateful blockchain virtual machine. That
is to build a virtual machine based on the latest state and
data of blockchain as a container to run bytecode to solve
the problem. The virtual machine can only read data from
system. Then, iners traverse the Nonce field and constantly
perform H = Hash(Nonce, block header) to get a hash
H . Furthermore, miners map H into the problem solution
space to get a potential solution. Given the problem solution
space [a1, b1]× [a2, b2]× . . .× [an, bn] and H , the potential
solution s can be calculated by the following equations:
si = ai +Himod (bi − ai + 1)
Hi+1 = Hi/(bi − ai + 1)
s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn)
(3)
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Fig. 7. The process of problem consensus
The blockchain virtual machine runs the bytecode (the
interface solve) of the problem with s as input, and it can
acquire data from the blockchain. During the virtual machine
running process, miners not only try to solve the problem, but
also generate a final workload through the Virtual machine
stack sampling proof algorithm. If a miner find a correct
solution, it can broadcast a slave block header and if it find a
workload smaller than the target, it can generate a new block.
The detail of one-round consensus is shown in Algorithm 1,
where min work is used to measure the amount of work
involved in calculating a problem (the smaller min work is,
the problem is more difficult and the more work).
Algorithm 1 Problem consensus protocol
1: construct header0
2: current problem←problem queue[0]
3: pos←0 && slave headers←φ
4: nonce←union(0,max(NONCE)− 1) . initial
randomly
5: solved←False . it represents whether the current
problem is solved
6: min work←max(WORK) . it records the minimum
workload found in solving current problem
7: min nonce←nonce . it corresponds to min work
8: work←max(WORK) . initial
9: while work > target do
10: if solved then // if the current problem is solved
11: // construct a slave block header
12: headerslave←pack(header0, pos, nonce,min nonce)
13: // include headerslave into slave headers
14: pos←pos+ 1 && slave headers←headerslave
15: broadcast slave headers
16: current problem←problem queue[pos]
17: min work←max(WORK)
18: min nonce←nonce
19: end if
20: if headerslave←network && valid(headerslave)
then
21: pos←pos+ 1 && slave headers←headerslave
22: current problem←problem queue[pos]
23: min work←max(WORK)
24: broadcast headerslave
25: end if
26: if blocknew←network && valid(blocknew) then
27: blockchain←blocknew && broadcast blocknew
28: return
29: end if
30: nonce←nonce+ 1
31: work, solved←stack proof(header0, nonce,current problem)
32: if work < min work then
33: min work←work && min nonce←nonce
34: end if
35: end while
36: // construct a master block header
37: master header←pack(header0, pos, nonce)
38: block←pack(master header, slave headers, block body)
39: blockchain←block && broadcast block
40: return
Problem Exit: When the current problem is successfully
solved and AxeChain has paid miners for solving the problem,
the problem is removed and all remaining deposit are returned
to the user. When the problem is not resolved and there is
still enough deposit to support the next round of solving after
paying for miners, the problem is reinserted into the queue;
otherwise, the problem is removed and the remaining deposit
is returned.
V. STACK SAMPLING PROOF ALGORITHM
A. Virtual machine stack sampling proof
Virtual machine stack sampling proof algorithm is designed
specifically for addressing Issue 2 of BBGS. Issue 2 is essen-
tially caused by the fact that the workload generation is not
coupled to the problem solving, that is, miners can skip the
calculation of the problem and generate a workload. In this
paper, we choose stack-based virtual machine as a container
for running problem contracts. When bytecode is executed in
the virtual machine, the impact of the corresponding operation
is mainly reflected on the top of the stack. We sample the
top elements of the stack and aggregates the sampling results
to get a digest stack digest of the contract running state.
The input to the problem contract is determined by the hash
H (H = Hash(Nonce, block header)), so stack digest is
uniform and random. Different Nonce corresponds to different
H , different H corresponds to different input to the problem
contract, so the stack contents and stack digest is different.
Finally, H is concatenated with stack digest to generate the
final workload. In this way, the final workload generation
and problem solving can be tightly coupled. In order to get
stack digest, the miner should run the problem bytecode
according to the input to get the stack contents.
Overview: The stack sampling proof algorithm has the
following basic requirements, which essentially make solving
problem as a superior strategy for miners.
1) Miners cannot predict the sampling location. The stack
should be sampled at different location for different H
(different Nonce).
2) Stack sampling can only performed serially with the
running of bytecode and cannot be done in parallel,
and the number of samplings is sufficient to get a more
comprehensive stack digest.
3) Single sampling should takes less time than running
a problem contract. If a single sampling takes much
more time than running problem contract, sampling is
meaningless.
Inspired by Ethereum Ethash [20], Virtual machine stack
sampling proof algorithm uses cryptographic hash algorithm
SHA-3 at both ends to ensure security, and uses FNV to ag-
gregate the sampling results of the stack to get stack digest.
FNV is a classic lightweight non-cryptographic hash algo-
rithm. In each round of collision, miners can only perform
H = SHA3(Nonce, block header) and map H to a potential
solution to get an input to the problem contract. This design
ensures that miners cannot predict the input to the problem
contract, so miners cannot predict stack digest. Since the fi-
nal workload is the result of SHA3(H||stack digest), miners
cannot get a final workload without calculating the problem.
As long as stack digest generated by the stack sampling
and aggregating is sufficiently discrete making it difficult for
miners to predict stack digest, miners have little chance of
evil and the system security can be ensured.
Generation of final workload: This paper uses 32 bytes
of SHA-3 and 8 bytes of FNV. The bit width of current
blockchain virtual machine is 256 (32 bytes). As shown in
Equation 4, the initial snapshot of stack sampling is obtained
by aggregating H through FNV, which costs three FNVs. The
hash H is grouped by 8 bytes during the aggregation process,
for example, H[0] represents the first 8 bytes of the hash.
snapshot0 = FNV (FNV (H[0], H[1]), FNV (H[2], H[3]))
(4)
The stack changes when running problem contract. The
elements at the top of the stack are most closely related to the
current operation, so stack sampling should focus on the top
elements of the stack. If there are not enough elements in the
stack, we can supplement it with H. This paper uses FNV to
aggregate the four elements at the top of the stack to update
the snapshot. The new snapshot is obtained by sequentially
performing FNV in bytes, and finally merging the intermediate
results. The aggregation is started from the initial snapshot
to prevent the attacker from designing the problem contract,
and calculating a part of the intermediate results in advance.
Since H is calculated by SHA-3, the attacker cannot predict
the initial snapshot and calculate the intermediate results in
advance. More details are shown in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Snapshot update
Require: Stack set: {stack0, stack1, stack2, stack3}, current
snopshot: snapshoti−1
Ensure: A new snapshot: snapshoti
1: T←∅
2: for stack in {stack0, stack1, stack2, stack3} do
3: for j = 1→ 32 do
4: snapshot←FNV (snapshot, uint64(stack[j]))
5: end for
6: T.append(snapshot)
7: end for
8: snapshoti = FNV (FNV (T [0], T [1]), FNV (T [2], T [3]))
9: snapshoti = FNV (snapshoti, snapshoti−1)
10: return snapshoti
In order to ensure that the sampling location are not
predictable, this paper uses the previous snapshot to update
the sampling location for current sampling. Given that the
snapshot after i− 1 samplings is snapshoti−1 and the stack
is sampled every time the problem contract consumes v gas,
the location for next sampling can be calculated as
next loction = (i− 1)v + snapshoti−1mod v (5)
The sampling method of this paper ensures that the sampling
location distribution and the stack contents are different for
different potential solutions. At the same time, if snapshoti−1
is not calculated, the next sampling location is unpredictable,
thus ensuring that the stack sampling runs serially.
Finally, the workload work0 can be calculated by Equation
6. state digest is the last snapshot of the stack sampling.
Since state digest is obtained by the non-cryptographic hash
algorithm FNV, its distribution will be slightly uneven. There-
fore, we use SHA-3 to guarantee the uniformity distribution
of work0. However, work0 cannot be directly compared to
difficulty target. The cost of generating a workload is differ-
ent for different problem contracts, so a uniform equivalent
workload is required. Assume that the gas consumed by one
SHA-3 is k times one FNV. For a problem contract with
nsample sampling locations, it takes nfnv FNVs to generate a
workload, including 2k FNVs for SHA-3 at both ends, 3 FNVs
for the initial snapshot and (32×4 + 3 + 1)×nsample FNVs
for nsample samplings (in Algorithm 2). The final (equivalent)
workload workfinal, which is used to compare against the tar-
get, can be calculated by Equation 7. If workfinal < target,
the miner can generate a new block and get reward.
work0 = SHA3(H||state digest) (6)
nfnv = 2k + 3 + (32×4 + 3 + 1)×nsample
workfinal = workequivalent = work0/nfnv
(7)
B. System security analysis
Here we assume an extreme case: the attacker carefully
designs a problem contract whose stack contents do not change
for different inputs at runtime. Therefore, the attacker can ob-
tain the stack contents in advance without running the problem
bytecode, while the honesty still needs to run the problem
bytecode. In this case, the attacker gains a relative advantage.
However, the attacker still needs to calculate state digest
through stack sampling algorithm. Even if the stack contents
are the same, state digest will vary depending on H (the
input to the initial snapshot). Therefore, miners still need to
do stack sampling but does not need to run the bytecode.
Utilization radio: The computing power of AxeChain is
used not only to execute bytecode for solving problems, but
also to stack sampling and SHA-3. The utilization ratio of
computing power η is used to measure the proportion of
the power that is actually used for problem solving, and its
definition is shown in Equation 8. gtotal is the gas consumed
to run the problem contract and gas is used to measure the
cost of the calculation. nfnv represents the number of FNVs
in the stack sampling and SHA-3, and gfnv represents the gas
consumed by one FNV. The larger nfnvgfnv , the more com-
puting resources the stack sampling consumes. The smaller
nfnvgfnv , the higher the utilization radio of computing power,
that is, only a small amount of computing power is used for
stack sampling and SHA-3, and most of the computing power
is used for problem calculation. From a macro perspective, the
computational power that is not used to solve the problem is
used to maintain the security of blockchain.
η =
gtotal
nfnvgfnv + gtotal
(8)
Security model: Assume that the proportion of honest
miners’ and attackers’ computing power to the whole network
is p and q, where p+ q = 1. Different from the traditional
PoW, the mining difficulty of honest miners and attackers
may be different in AxeChain. An attacker can submit a
well-constructed problem contract, which allow him to mine
without running the problem bytecode. Compared with honest
drivers, attackers do not need to spend gtotal gas to run
bytecode. The larger gtotal is, the larger nsample and nfnv
are. We can adjust the sampling frequency to adjust the gap
between gtotal and nfnvgfnv , that is η. In the case of the same
physical computing power, the attacker can generate a block
faster than the honest miners. The ratio of block generation
rate between the attackers and honest miners can be calculated
as:
δ =
q/nfnvgfnv
p/(nfnvgfnv + gtotal)
=
q
p
1
1− η (9)
q/nfnvgfnv represents the attackers’ equivalent computing
power while p/(nfnvgfnv + gtotal) represents the miners’
equivalent computing power. In addition, η represents the
utilization ratio of computing power. According to gambler’s
ruin problem [34], in the case of being behind z blocks, the
probability that attackers can successfully catch up with honest
miners is:
Qz(δ) =
{
δz δ < 1 andz > 0
1 δ ≥ or z ≤ 0 (10)
Assume that the blockchain system is y confirmations. y
confirmations means that a transaction is considered almost
irreversible when it is supported by y blocks. In Bitcoin, y
is equal to 6. When y confirmations is observed on the main
chain, the number of blocks generated by the attacker in the
darkness satisfies the Poisson distribution with λ = δy and we
record it as P (x). The probability of a successful attack is:
P (an attack, y confirmations) =
+∞∑
x=0
P (x)Qz(y − x)
= 1−
y∑
x=0
λxe−λ
x!
(1− δy−x)
(11)
It can be seen from Equation 11 that when δ < 1, the proba-
bility of a successful attack decreases exponentially with the
increase of y. In other words, the system is robust as long as
δ < 1. According to δ < 1, p+ q = 1 and Equation 9, we can
deduce that the radio of attackers’ computing power q has the
following constraint:
q < 1− 1
2− η (12)
By plotting the function f(x) = 1− 12−x , we can get an
balance curve of power utilization radio and system security
(fault tolerance), which is shown in Figure 8. Overall, system
security slowly decreases as the utilization radio of computing
power increases. It is difficult to reach a consensus on a system
which aimed to solve general problems submitted by users.
Therefore, the security of the system is unlikely to be ensured
when the power utilization radio reaches 100%. The system
needs a part of the computing power to maintain the security of
the blockchain system, and Virtual machine stack sampling
proof algorithm is the means used in this paper to maintain
system security.
As shown in Figure 8, as long as slightly sacrificing the
system security factor from 1/2 of PoW to that of the BFT-like
algorithm with 1/3 of fault tolerance [35]–[37], the system can
achieve 50% of power utilization; slightly sacrificing system
security factor to that of the ripple algorithm with 1/4 of
fault tolerance [38], the system can achieve 66.7% of power
utilization. At the peak, Bitcoin consumed 60 billion kWh/year
Fig. 8. The relationship between utilization radio and system fault tolerance
[5]. Taking the computing power of Bitcoin as the benchmark
and 1/3 as the security factor, AxeChain will consum 30
billion kWh/year to solve the user’s practical problems. It is
undeniable that the blockchain system at this time is not only a
secure decentralized ledger, but also a decentralized computing
platform with strong computing power.
VI. INCENTIVE MODEL
A reasonable incentive model is very important to the
blockchain, which needs to balance the interests of all parties
involved. In the existing researches [14]–[16], the reward
for solving problems is completely subjectively determined
by users. In most cases, it is difficult for a user to give a
reasonable reward because they do not know the difficulty
of the problem. Users worry about paying too much, while
miners worry about too little income. The incentive model
in this paper will assign reward to miners according to the
amount of work exactly involved in calculating the problem
and the extra rewards will be returned to users. Consequently,
it can avoid the loss of both the users and miners.
The incentive mode refers to the deduction of users’ deposit
and the way miners receives the reward when a new block
is generated. Assuming that the probability of reaching the
block generation requirement in a single collision is p0, then
the expected number of collisions to generate a new block
is 1/p0. The benchmark excitation W is used to measure
the calculation cost of 1/p0 collisions. W can be estimated
by 1/p0 and the average gas consumed for per collision
based on different problem contracts. In AxeChain, a block
header cluster consists of a master block header and k
slave block headers. All block headers correspond to the
problems {Qn−k, Qn−k+1, . . ., Qn−1, Qn} and users deposit
{Depositn−k, Depositn−k+1, . . ., Depositn−1, Depositn}.
First, the system assigns reward for the master block header.
The system deducts W from Depositn as a reward for the mas-
ter miner. The master miner receives the slave block headers
corresponding to Qn−k, Qn−k+1, . . ., Qn−1, indicating that
until the master miner receives the slave block corresponding
to Qn−1, the whole network still has not found a valid work-
load through collision. Hash collision is memoryless, so the
expected time for the entire network to find a valid workload is
irrelevant to the hash collision before Qn. When solving Qn,
the expected number of collisions to find a valid workload
is equal to that required by block generation, corresponding
to the benchmark excitation W . The derivation is shown in
Equation 13.
E(µQm) =
+∞∑
x=1
x(1− p0)x−1p0 = 1/p0 (13)
Next, the system assigns reward for the slave block headers.
The expected number of collisions for all slave block headers
also tends to that required by block generation. Its derivation
is shown in Equation 14. It can be understood here that if
the expected number of collisions required to solve Qn−k
is small, then there will be more time to solve Qn−k+1,
and so on. Therefore, the corresponding calculation cost for
Qn−k, Qn−k+1, . . ., Qn−1 is W.
E(µQn−k,...,Qn−1 |no block generation before Qn)
=
+∞∑
x=1
x
(1− p0)x∑+∞
y=1(1− p0)y
= 1/p0
(14)
It is determined that corresponding calculation cost for
Qn−k, Qn−k+1, . . ., Qn−1 is W, and the system needs to
determine the calculation cost for each problem and deduct
it from the corresponding deposit. Equation 15 shows the
calculation cost CostDepositn−i for a single problem, includ-
ing variable portion 0.5Wψn−i and fixed portion 0.5W/k. k
represents the number of block slave headers 1 ≤ i ≤ k. ψn−i
reflects the proportion of each problem in variable portion
0.5Wψn−i. min workn−i indicates the minimum workload
found in solving Qn−i from the slave miner (in Algorithm 1),
reflecting the difficulty of Qn−i. If Qn−i is more difficult,
min workn−i will be smaller. min workn−i is provided
from the slave miner. Although it is not equal to the minimum
workload found when the whole network solves Qn−i, it
reflects the difficulty of Qn−i to some extent. The fixed portion
0.5W/k is to ensure that the slave miner would broadcast the
corresponding slave block header when it successfully solved a
problem. If CostDepositn−i is calculated based only on ψn−i,
that is CostDepositn−i = Wψn−i, the following may occur:
A lucky miner solves a problem with only one collision, but it
will not broadcast a slave block header because min workn−i
is too large. Therefore, a design that requires a fixed portion
0.5Wψn−i is necessary.
ψn−i =
1
min workn−i∑k
i=1
1
min workn−i
CostDepositn−i =
W
2
(
1
k
+ ψn−i)
(15)
In addition, when a miner is both the master miner and slave
miner, it is unable to obtain the reward corresponding to the
slave block header. Otherwise, when a miner receives a slave
block header (corresponding to problem Q), the miner thinks
that it is also possible for him to solve Q and get a reward
and then refuse to include the slave block header. Therefore, If
there are some slave block headers that are generated by the
master miner, the corresponding reward should be deducted
from the corresponding user deposit and then be destroyed.
The incentive model based on the amount of work exactly
involved in calculating the problem allows the user not to
worry about giving too much deposit, but also to ensure that
miners can obtain a reasonable income. At the same time,
this incentive model is based on the fact that miners not
only provide a secure decentralized system, but also solve
meaningful practical problems constantly, so it can provide
more value endorsement for the cryptocurrency it creates.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We implement all components of AxeChain based on
Ethereum Client, Geth [39]. Our implementation mainly mod-
ifies the data layer, conseneus layer, incentive layer, and
contract layer of Geth. In order to evaluate AxeChain, we
mainly conducted two experiments, Security Experiment and
Problem Solving. The former is to verify that stack sampling
proof can ensure system security on different problem con-
tracts; the latter is to get the relationship between the problem
difficulty, deposit, and probability of successful solving to
evaluate the availability and feasibility of AxeChain.
A. Security Experiment
The problems raised by users are innumerable, but the
computational requirements of the problem can be essentially
decomposed into the basic operation units including addi-
tion, subtraction, multiplication, division, and integer modulo.
These arithmetic unit constitutes five basic modes for the
change of the stack contents. For comparison, we also studied
the mode in which the stack contents are constant. In this
subsection, we conduct an experimental analysis of the nature
and distribution of state digest (64bit) obtained from the
above six modes to verify that the stack sampling can ensure
system security on any problem contract.
Algorithm 3 shows the test function for each mode,
where the input parameter X is derived from H
(H = Hash(Nonce, block header)). After the test function
performs a basic operation unit on the input parameters xi
in turn, and compares result with the threshold to determine
whether to generate a slave block header. The test function
can be represented as a specific problem contract and
loaded into the virtual machine for execution. We use 12
unsigned-64bit integers as X = {x1, x2, . . ., xk} (ie k = 12)
and let n = 100 (ie 8-9 operations for each xk in one
execution of test function). For each mode, we generated 106
uniformly distributed X through SHA3 and set four different
sampling frequencies (10%, 20%, 30%, 40%), and finally
collected all the stack digests, a total of 24×106 digests
for 24 combinations (4 frequencies × 6 modes). Assuming
a contract consumes 1000 gas for one exection, then 10%
sampling frequency means that the stack is sampled every
100 gas.
Algorithm 3 Test function
Require: Operation type: Op, input parameter:
X = {x1, x2, . . ., xk}, number of operations: n, threshold
of solution: r0
Ensure: A boolean value
1: result←∅
2: for j = 0→ n− 1 do
3: result←Op(result, x(i mod k)+1)
4: end for
5: return result < r0
We performed a statistical analysis on all the stack digests,
and found that these 24×106 digests did not collide (that is,
they are different from each other). It is worth noting that even
if the stack content is constant, state digest for different X
are still different. Therefore, even if the attacker can calculate
the stack contents in advance, it can not skip the calculation
of the digest to calculate a final workload. In addition, we
also analyze the distribution of state digest obtained from
all modes at different sampling frequencies, and then show
the uniformity distribution of state digest in 64-bit binary
space, which is shown in Figure 9.
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Fig. 9. Distribution of state digest in different modes
For every combination, we counted the frequency of
state digest in the range [0, 2i] as #(2i), and then we plotted
with i as abscissa and log2[#(2i)] as ordinate, which is shown
in Figure 9. Ideally, the distribution law of the frequency
satisfies #(2i) = 2×#(2i−1), that is, equivalent to Equation
16. As shown in Figure 9, the distribution of state digest
under 24 combinations satisfies Equation 16, showing a linear
growth trend with a growth rate close to 1. It shows that
state digest is sufficiently discrete and uniform in different
combinations, so that it is difficult for an attacker to design
a problem contract to attack the system by exploiting the
deviation of state digest uniformity.
log2[#(2
i)] = log2[#(2
i−1)] + 1 (16)
B. Problem Solving
In this Experiment, we deploy 32 nodes locally and sub-
mitted a series of problems to calculate the frequency that
each set of problems of different difficulty will be successfully
solved under different reward. We simulate networks of 32
local nodes by 32 machines, each of which runs a AxeChain
instance with four threads for mining (occupying 50% CPU
utilization). Each machine has an Inter(R) Core(TM) i7-4790
CPU @ 1.3GHz processor and an 8GB memory. We use
subset-sum problems (in Section IV-B) as test problems and
submit them to the simulation network. A test problem can be
defined as: Given a set S = {1, 2, 3, . . ., n}, find a subset of S
whose sum is Z and Z = n(n+1)2 − 1. Thus, the difficulty of
a test problem can defined as Dn = 12n . The larger n is, the
smaller the Dn is, and the more difficult the problem is. In our
experiments, we take n = 29, 30, 31, 32 and set the system’s
benchmark excitation to W (in Section VI). For four types
of problems with different difficulty (different n), we provide
different reward R and R∈[W, 50W ]. For each combination
C = {n,R}, we submit 100 problems separately, and calculate
the frequency of successful solving.
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Fig. 10. The situation of problem solving
As shown in Figure 10, for the problem with same difficulty,
as the problems reward increases, the frequency of successful
solving approaches linear growth and eventually approaches
100%. In other words, as long as the user gives enough reward
and the problem is solvable, the problem will be solved by
AxeChain. At the same time, the user does not have to worry
about providing too much reward, because the extra reward
will be returned to the user. In addition, it can be seen that for
the same reward, the less difficult the problem (the smaller n),
the greater the frequency of successful solving.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Currently, for the energy waste of PoW, the existing studies
are mainly divided into two categories. On the one hand,
the mainstream alternative is Proof-of-Stake (PoS) [7], [25].
At present, PoS is still controversial, and there are still
many issues that need to be addressed. Nicolas Houy et al.
claimed that malicious attackers can easily perform the cost-
free simulated attacks on the PoS-based blockchain systems
[11], while Poelstra claimed that external resource consuming
is necessary for blockchain security [10]. In addition, PoS will
widen the gap between rich and poor. In extreme cases, the
rich may control the entire network, leading to centralization.
On the other hand, there are a few studies that translate the
hash energy consumption of PoW into meaningful work. For
example, Primecoin [12] replaces hash calculation with search
of prime sequence and Gapcoin [13] searches for large prime
gaps. However, the application of prime sequences is very
limited. Besides, since the distribution of prime numbers has
not been confirmed by humans, the reliability of the difficulty
retargeting mechanism of Primecoin cannot be guaranteed.
In the study [14], Carlos G. Oliver et al. proposed that the
hash energy of PoW can be used to solve the NP-complete
problems. However, as analyzed in Section III, the proposed
consensus mechanism has serious security issues due to BBGS.
Similar studies also include Hybrid Mining [15] and Proof-
of-Accumulated-Work (PoAW) [16]. Hybrid Mining also uses
BBGS, so it has the same security issues as the study [14].
In order to limit the number of problems in the network
(prevent attackers from overwhelming the network with many
spam problems), Hybrid Mining has greatly increased the cost
of submitting problems, which is not friendly to users and
reduces the availability of the system. PoAW introduces PoS
to form a subnet of miners to manage and verify problems,
which will bring security issues of PoS itself. In addition,
the reward for solving problems in [14]–[16] is completely
subjectively determined by users, which can easily lead to
unfairness between users and miners. It is worth noting that
most of the existing researches focus on solving a certain type
of problem (mostly NP problems) and require users to convert
the problem into a specific format (such as SAT in Hybrid
Mining), so they cannot extend to other application scenarios.
In addition, there are also some related studies in the dis-
tributed field. One of the most well-known projects is GIMPS
[40], which can find huge prime numbers in a distributed man-
ner. Another project is Folding@Home and Genome@Home
[41], which can solve the hard problem of protein folding that
is of great interest to biologists. However, these projects do not
provide incentive for contributors and most of the computation
is done by volunteers. Therefore, the overall computational
power of these projects is far less than that of blockchain.
Besides, there is a centralized organization to maintain these
project, which runs counter to decentralization of blockchain.
Compared with the existing researches, AxeChain can use
the computing power of blockchain to solve meaningful prac-
tical problems while providing strong security guarantees. Ax-
eChain addresses the security issues in the existing researches
through Axe blockchain architecture and Virtual machine
stack sampling proof algorithm. In addition, AxeChain use
Turing-complete high-level language to represent a problem
as a smart contract, making the submission of problems more
flexible and versatile. The problems submitted to AxeChain
are not limited to one type of problem (such as NP problems)
and AxeChain can meet a wider range of computing needs.
Besides, AxeChain’s incentive model can make the blockchain
incentive mechanism more practical, which balances the inter-
ests of users and miners and provides more value endorsement
for cryptocurrency.
IX. CONCLUSION
We present AxeChain, the first Strongly Secure and Fully
Decentralized blockchain for solving Easily-Verifiable prob-
lems. At its core, AxeChain can translate the hash energy
consumption of PoW into useful work while providing strong
security guarantees. It is worth noting that the problems that
can be submitted to AxeChain will be very diverse (not limited
to NP problems), so the computing services provided by
AxeChain are more versatile. Additionally, the new incentive
model in this paper can make the blockchain incentive mech-
anism more practical and provide more value endorsement for
cryptocurrency.
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APPENDIX
A. Problem Contract Sample
1) Diophantine Equation: The problem contract for find-
ing a solution that Diophantine Equation X3 + Y 3 + Z3 = 42
can be shown in Figure 11.
2) Non-linear integer programming problem: The prob-
lem contract can be shown in Figure 12 and it finds a solution
for
max 7x21 − 8x32 + 9x1x2−3x1x2 + 5x4 − x25
x1 + x
2
2 + x
3
3 ≤ 2014
x1x3 − x2x4 − 5x5 ≤ 256
x2 < 2x5
x1x2 + x3 + x
2
4 − x5 > 1024
(17)
3) Token Airdrop: The blockchain project party performs
the initial issuance of the token through the contract Comput-
ingToken shown in Figure 13, and then selects the appropriate
token user (active user) through the filtering problem contract
filterProblem shown in Figure 14 to perform the secondary
issuance of the token. AxeChain helps the project party find
the right users quickly and the result is time-sensitive.
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}
contract DiophantineProblem is template {
    function getTips() public pure returns(uint256) {
        return 500000;
    }
    function getSpaceInfo() public view returns(int256[2][] memory) {
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    function getTips() public pure returns(uint256);
    function getSpaceInfo() public view returns(int256[2][] memory);
    function getTimes() public pure returns(uint256);
    function solve() public view returns(bool);
}
contract MaxProblem is template {
    function getTips() public pure returns(uint256) {
        return 800000;
    }
    function getSpaceInfo() public view returns(int256[2][] memory) {
        int256[2][] memory solutionSpace = new int256[2][](5);
        solutionSpace[0] = [int256(0), 100];
        solutionSpace[1] = [int256(3), 30];
        solutionSpace[2] = [int256(10), 200];
        solutionSpace[3] = [int256(3), 1024];
        solutionSpace[4] = [int256(3), 256];
        return solutionSpace;
    }
    function getTimes() public pure returns(uint256) {
        // Find 10 eligible solutions for optimal
        return 10;
    }
    function solve(int256 x1, int256 x2, int256 x3, 
    int256 x4, int256 x5) public view returns(bool) {
        require(x1 + x2*x2 + x3*x3*x3 <= 1024);
        require(x1*x3 - x2*x4 - 5*x5 <= 256);
        require(x2 < 2*x5);
        require(x1*x2 + x3 + x4*x4 - x5 > 1024);
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>
pragma solidity ^0.5.0;
contract ComputingToken {
    mapping (address => uint256) balances;
    address[] holders;
    uint256 public totalSupply;
    constructor(uint256 _initialAmount) public {
        require(_initialAmount > 0);
        totalSupply = _initialAmount;
        balances[msg.sender] = totalSupply;
        holders.push(msg.sender);
    }
    function transfer(address _to, uint256 _value) public returns (bool success) {
        require(_value > 0 && balances[msg.sender] >= _value 
        && balances[_to] + _value > balances[_to]);
        require(_to != address(0x0));
        if (balances[_to] == 0) {
            holders.push(_to);
        }
        balances[_to] += _value;
        return true;
    }
    function balanceOf(address _owner) public view returns (uint256 balance) {
        return balances[_owner];
    }
    function getHolderNumber() public view returns (uint256) {
        return holders.length;
    }
    function getHolderBalance(uint256 number) public view returns (uint256) {
        return balances[holders[number % holders.length]];
    }
}
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>
pragma solidity ^0.5.0;
contract template {
    function getTips() public pure returns(uint256);
    function getSpaceInfo() public view returns(int256[2][] memory);
    function getTimes() public pure returns(uint256);
    function solve() public view returns(bool);
}
contract TokenInterface {
    function getHolderNumber() public view returns (uint256);
    function getHolderBalance(uint256 number) public view returns (uint256);
}
contract filterProblem is template {
    function getTips() public pure returns (uint256) {
        return 1;
    }
    function getSpaceInfo() public view returns (int256[2][] memory) {
        TokenInterface t = TokenInterface(0x80970fED061E7747Cd9A38D680A601510cB659fB);
        int256[2][] memory space = new int256[2][](1);
        space[0] = [0, int256(t.getHolderNumber() - 1)];
        return space;
    }
    function getTimes() public pure returns (uint256) {
        return 1;
    }
    function solve(uint256 number) public view returns (bool) {
        TokenInterface t = TokenInterface(0x80970fED061E7747Cd9A38D680A601510cB659fB);
        uint256 _balance = t.getHolderBalance(number);
        return _balance > 5;
    }
}
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